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Abstract
This study presents an overlapping-generations model featuring capital accumu-
lation, collective wage-bargaining, and probabilistic voting over scal policy. We
characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game within and
across generations and show the following results. First, greater bargaining power of
unions lowers the growth rate of capital and creates a positive correlation between
unemployment and public debt. Second, greater political power of the old lowers
the growth rate and shifts government expenditure from the unemployed to the
old. Third, when the government nances its spending by issuing public debt, an
introduction of a balanced-budget requirement increases the growth rate but may
benet the old at the expense of the unemployed.
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1 Introduction
Public debt and economic growth have been major concerns for policymakers in most
advanced countries for the past decades, and the debt-to-GDP ratio has increased in many
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries over the last
twenty years. The burden of debt repayment is expected to crowd out private investment
and deteriorate economic performance in the long run. The evidence suggests a negative
non-linear correlation between public debt and economic growth in advanced economies
(see, e.g., Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogo, 2012; Kumar and Woo, 2010; Checherita-
Westphal and Rother, 2012).
The negative growth eect of public debt has been suggested using a theoretical ap-
proach based on neoclassical growth models (Diamond, 1965) and later based on en-
dogenous ones (Saint-Paul, 1992; Josten, 2000; Brauninger, 2005). These works assume
perfectly competitive labor markets that realize full employment. To consider the eect in
a more realistic environment, some recent studies have extended these models by includ-
ing unemployment and have investigated the eects of scal policy on economic growth
in the presence of unemployment (Kaas and von Thadden, 2004; Josten, 2006; Greiner
and Flaschel, 2010; Yakita, 2014).
However, the following two issues are left unanswered in these studies. First, a high
unemployment rate puts political pressure on the government to increase spending in
favor of the unemployed. This pressure incentivizes the government to issue more debt to
nance expanding expenditure, resulting in crowding out of capital accumulation. That
is, there is a political eect of unemployment on scal policy and economic growth. This
is an untouched issue in these studies, which take scal policy as exogenously given.
Second, there is large expenditure in advanced countries with an aging population:
an intergenerational redistribution from the young to the old, such as via public pensions
and health and nursing care systems for the aged. This implies the strong political power
of the old, which puts pressure on the government to shift scal burdens from older to
younger generations, resulting in crowding out of capital accumulation. Kaas and von
Thadden (2004), Josten (2006), and Yakita (2014) employ overlapping-generations mod-
els that potentially account for such a process, but they assume a single policy (i.e.,
unemployment-insurance benets) and set aside the possibility of intergenerational redis-
tribution.
This study addresses these two issues. For this purpose, we employ a two-period
overlapping-generations model with AK technology (Romer, 1986) and collective wage-
bargaining (see, e.g., Kaas and von Thadden, 2003, 2004; Coimbra, Lloyd-Braga, and
Modesto, 2005; Chang, Shaw, and Lai, 2007) to demonstrate capital accumulation and
unemployment. Government spending is represented by unemployment-insurance benets
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for the unemployed and public services for the old.1 The spending is nanced by taxes
on the young and may also be funded through issuance of public bonds.
The unemployment-insurance benet creates a conict of interest between the unem-
ployed and the employed. Furthermore, spending on services for the old creates a conict
of interest between the young (both the employed and the unemployed) and the old. To
demonstrate these two combinations of conicts, we assume probabilistic voting a la Lind-
beck and Weibull (1987), where the government objective is to maximize the weighted
sum of the utility of the young employed, the young unemployed, and the retired old.
In particular, we employ a Markov strategy in which policy variables are conditioned on
payo-relevant state variables (Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull, 1997). This strategy
enables us to demonstrate the forward-looking behavior of individuals who consider in-
tertemporal interaction between current and future policies through capital accumulation
(see, e.g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008, 2012; Song, 2011; Kunze, 2014; Lancia and
Russo, 2015).
Within this framework, we consider the rst issue and show that increased union
power results in higher unemployment and a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus, a positive
correlation holds between unemployment and debt. This result is in line with previous
studies by Kaas and von Thadden (2004; who show a positive correlation under capital
shortages) and Battaglini and Coate (2014; who show pro-cyclical behavior of unemploy-
ment and debt arising from time-varying productivity). The present study presents an
alternative approach to explain this positive correlation. Following this, we consider the
second issue and show that greater political power of the old results in a higher ratio of
spending for the old to GDP, a lower ratio of unemployment-insurance benets to GDP,
and a lower growth rate of capital. The result suggests that population aging results in
a shift of resources from the unemployed young to the old, and the old harm economic
growth through redistributive politics.
To assess the impact of debt nance, we consider an alternative budget scenario, that
is, a balanced budget where government spending is solely nanced by tax. Then, we
compare the unbalanced- (i.e., debt nance) and balanced-budget cases, and obtain the
following result. When the government nances its spending by issuing public bonds (i.e.,
by borrowing in the capital market), the introduction of a balanced-budget requirement
results in a higher ratio of spending for the old to GDP and a higher growth rate, but may
result in a lower unemployment-insurance payment-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, the intro-
duction of the balanced-budget requirement is benecial from the viewpoint of economic
growth, but it may benet the old at the expense of the unemployed young.
1In general, there are two types of public expenditure on the old: public pensions, which compensate
for the lack of income during the retirement period, and public services, which improve utility in old age.
The present study focuses on the latter type of expenditure to make the analysis tractable.
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The present study contributes to the two strands of political economy literature. The
rst is the literature on the positive theory of scal policy (see, e.g., Battaglini and Coate,
2008; Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2012; Barseghyan, Battaglini, and Coate, 2013;
Battaglini, 2014; Arai and Naito, 2014; Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate, 2015; Ono,
2015). In particular, the framework of the present study is based on that of Arai and
Naito (2014) and Ono (2015): we introduce the managerial trade union as a source of
unemployment into their model. The present study focuses on the same issue as Battaglini
and Coate (2014), who analyze the political decision on scal policy in the presence
of unemployment. However, they assume (i) exogenous wage rigidity and time-varying
productivity as a source of unemployment; and (ii) no saving behavior and thus no capital
accumulation. In contrast, this study assumes collective wage-bargaining to demonstrate
the mechanism in which unemployment arises as an equilibrium phenomenon, and the
AK technology to demonstrate the eect of scal policy on capital accumulation in the
presence of unemployment.
The second strand includes works on intragenerational and intergenerational redis-
tributive politics in models with physical and/or human capital accumulation (see, e.g.,
Poutvaara, 2006; Bassetto, 2008; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008, 2012; Song, 2011;
Bernasconi and Profeta, 2012; Uchida, 2015). They assume competitive labor markets
and thus no equilibrium unemployment. In contrast, this study presents equilibrium un-
employment, and demonstrates an intragenerational conict between the employed and
the unemployed and an intergenerational conict between the young (both the employed
and the unemployed) and the old. Within this environment, we consider redistributive
politics over unemployment-insurance benets and redistribution targeting the elderly.
We show the eects of intragenerational and intergenerational conicts on scal policy
and capital accumulation in the presence of unemployment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
characterizes the economic equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes a political equilibrium
when government expenditure is nanced by tax and public bonds issue. In Section 4, we
consider an alternative scenario, that is, a balanced budget where government expenditure
is solely nanced by tax. Then, we compare the two scenarios in terms of government
expenditure and economic growth. Section 5 checks the robustness of the results under
alternative assumptions, and provides directions for future research. Proofs are provided
in the Appendix.
2 Model and Economic Equilibrium
Consider a two-period-lived overlapping-generations model where the economy is com-
prised of perfectly competitive rms, ex ante identical individuals, a trade union, and a
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government. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0; 1; 2;    . A new generation is born in
each period t = 0; 1; 2;    , and individuals in each generation live for two periods, youth
and old age. No population growth is assumed, and the population in each generation is
normalized to unity.
2.1 Preferences and Utility Maximization
An individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically in youth and retires in old age. The
lifetime utility of an individual born in period t is given by
U it = ln c
yi
t +  ln c
oi
t+1 +  ln gt+1;
where cyit is consumption in youth, c
oi
t+1 is consumption in old age, gt+1 is public services
for the old (e.g., medical care systems and nursing-care insurance systems),  2 (0; 1)
is a discount factor, and (> 0) captures the preference weight for public services. The
subscript t denotes the period of consumption, and the superscript i denotes the status
of labor: i = e and i = u if an individual is employed and unemployed, respectively. The
status is assigned according to bargaining between the trade union and the rm (described
later) at the beginning of each period. The specication of the logarithmic utility function
makes aggregation of the savings functions tractable.
An individual chooses consumption and savings to maximize his or her lifetime utility
under the following budget constraints:
cyit + s
i
t  xt(1  t)wt + (1  xt)bt; xt 2 f0; 1g
coit+1  Rt+1sit;
where xt = 1 and xt = 0 if an individual is employed and unemployed, respectively, wt is
wage, bt is unemployment-insurance benet, st is savings, Rt+1 is gross interest rate, and
t is tax on labor income. Unemployment-insurance benets are assumed to be exempt
from taxation. Section 6 briey examines the case of taxation on unemployment-insurance
benets.
By solving the utility-maximization problem, we obtain the savings function of a type-i
individual as follows:
sit =

1 + 
fxt(1  t)wt + (1  xt)btg :
The corresponding consumption functions are
cyit =
1
1 + 
fxt(1  t)wt + (1  xt)btg ;
coit+1 =
Rt+1
1 + 
fxt(1  t)wt + (1  xt)btg :
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These functions state that a higher wage level or unemployment-insurance benets
implies higher savings and consumption, whereas a higher tax rate implies lower savings
and consumption. Using these functions, the indirect utility functions of the employed,
the unemployed, and the old are given by
V yet = (1 + ) ln(1  t)wt +  lnRt+1 +  ln gt+1;
V yut = (1 + ) ln bt +  lnRt+1 +  ln gt+1;
V ot =  ln gt;
respectively. Terms unrelated to political decisions are omitted from these expressions.
2.2 Technology and Prot Maximization
There is a continuum of identical rms that are perfectly competitive prot maximizers
producing the nal product Yt with a constant returns-to-scale Cobb{Douglas production
function, Yt = At (Kt)
 (Lt)
1 . Here, At is the productivity parameter, Kt is aggregate
capital, Lt is aggregate labor, and  2 (0; 1) is a constant parameter representing capital
share. Capital is assumed to fully depreciate within a period.
In each period t, a rm chooses capital and labor in order to maximize its prot,
At (Kt)
 (Lt)
1    tKt   wtLt, where t is the rental price of capital and wt is the wage
rate. The rm takes these prices as given. The rst-order conditions with respect to Kt
and Lt are given by
Kt : t = At (Kt)
 1 (Lt)
1  ;
Lt : wt = (1  )At (Kt) (Lt)  :
The productivity parameter At is assumed to be proportional to the aggregate capital
in the overall economy: At = A (Kt)
1 . Capital investment thus involves a technological
externality of the type often used in theories of endogenous growth (Romer, 1986). This
assumption, called the \AK" technology, results in a constant interest rate across periods
as demonstrated below. This approach enables us to obtain an analytical solution for the
model: that is, our model becomes tractable.
Under this assumption, the rst-order conditions are rewritten as follows:
t = A (lt)
1  = Rt; (1)
wt = (1  )AKt (lt)  ; (2)
where lt is the employment rate in the economy, and lt = Lt holds because the number of
people in each generation is unity. The arbitrage condition t = Rt holds for all t, because
the market for capital is competitive and capital fully depreciates within a period.
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2.3 Government Budget Constraint
Fiscal policy is determined through elections, and public bonds are traded in a domestic
capital market. Let Dt denote the aggregate inherited debt. A budget constraint in period
t is
Dt+1 + tltwt = gt + (1  lt)bt +RtDt; (3)
where Dt+1 is newly issued public bonds, tltwt is the labor income-tax revenue, gt is
expenditure for the old, (1   lt)bt is unemployment-insurance payments, and RtDt is
debt repayment. We assume that the government in each period is committed to not
repudiating the debt.
Equation (3) indicates that the government can freely issue public bonds as long as it
satises the ow-budget constraint. We demonstrate the political equilibrium outcome of
this case in Section 3. In Section 4, we consider an alternative case where the government
is constitutionally required to keep a balanced budget in each period. That is, the govern-
ment must satisfy the constraint tltwt = gt+ (1  lt)bt. This requirement is stricter than
the rule where debt cannot increase across periods (see, e.g., Azzimonti, Battaglini, and
Coate, 2015). The present study thus adopts a stricter rule to investigate how allowing
debt nance aects scal policy-making and capital accumulation.
2.4 Right-to-manage Model
Following Pemberton (1988), we assume a managerial trade union whose objective is
to pursue two targets: a high real wage, wt, and a high rate of employment, lt. In
particular, the trade union's objective function is specied using the following Cobb{
Douglas function:
(wt   wt)  (lt)1  ;
where wt is the reference wage of the trade union, and  2 (0; 1) is a parameter capturing
the relative intensity of the two targets.
Following Corneo and Marquardt (2000), we assume that the reference wage is the
competitive wage, which is calculated by setting lt = 1 in the rst-order condition with
respect to labor, (2):
wt = (1  )AKt:
Alternatively, we assume that the reference wage is set to the unemployment-insurance
benets, wt = bt (see, e.g., Chang, Shaw, and Lai, 2007), which is discussed in Section 6.
The present study employs the right-to-manage model (see, e.g., Benassy, 2011, Chap-
ter 15, and Heijdra, 2009, Chapter 7, for an overview of the model). The union and the
rm bargain over wages through a generalized Nash bargaining solution. Given the solu-
tion, employment is determined to satisfy the labor demand function of the rm. Accord-
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ing to this solution, the wage that is chosen after bargaining maximizes the geometrically
weighted average of the gains to the union and the rm subject to the rm's demand for
labor. Formally, the problem is as follows:
max
wt

t =
h
(wt   wt) (lt)1 
i
 At (Kt) (lt)1    wtlt1 
s.t. wt = (1  )At (Kt) (lt) 
given wt;
where  2 [0; 1] represents the relative strength of the union. The term (wt   wt) (lt)1 
is the gain to the union, whereas the term At (Kt)
 (lt)
1    wtlt is the gain to the rm.
To solve the problem, we impose the following assumption that ensures the second-
order condition for an interior solution.
Assumption 1.  < min
n
1; 1 
(1 )+
o
.
Under Assumption 1, the wage determined through bargaining becomes
wt =  wt = (1  )AKt; (4)
where the second equality comes from wt = (1  )AKt, and  is dened by
  (1  ) + (1  )(1  )
(1  ) + (1  )(1  )   (> 1):
The derivation of (4) is provided in Appendix A.1.
We substitute (4) into the labor demand function wt = (1   )AKt (lt)  to obtain
the employment rate determined through bargaining:
lt = l  (1=)1= : (5)
Given that  is increasing in , we can immediately get that higher union power yields
lower employment, @l=@ < 0.
Equation (5) indicates that the employment rate (or unemployment rate) is inde-
pendent of scal policy and the stock of capital. This implies that the present model
demonstrates the eect of (un)employment on scal policy and capital accumulation, but
it does not show the reverse eect. This property, caused by the specication of collective
wage-bargaining, shows some of the limitations of this study. However, the present model
enables us to consider the interaction between scal policy and capital accumulation in
the presence of unemployment.
Using (5), we can write the aggregate output and the gross interest rate in terms of
the employment rate:
Yt = AKtl(l)
  = AlKt; (6)
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Rt = Al(l)
  = Al  R: (7)
We use the expressions in (5), (6), and (7) in the following analysis. Hereafter, we often
use R instead of Rt = Al to simplify the presentation.
2.5 Economic Equilibrium
A market-clearing condition for capital is Kt+1 +Dt+1 = st, which expresses the equality
of total savings by young agents in generation t, st  ltset + (1  lt)sut , to the sum of the
stocks of aggregate physical capital and aggregate public debt, Kt+1 +Dt+1:
Dt+1 +Kt+1 =

1 + 
fl(1  t)(1  )AKt + (1  l)btg : (8)
We are now ready to formally dene an economic equilibrium in the present model.
Denition 1. Given a sequence of policy parameters ft; bt; gt; Dt+1g1t=0, an economic
equilibrium is a sequence of prices and allocations,

cyit ; c
oi
t+1; s
i
t; lt; Kt; wt; wt; t; Rt
	1
t=0
,
with initial conditions K0 and D0 such that the following conditions are satised:
(i) given (wt; Rt+1) and a scal policy,
 
cyit ; c
oi
t+1; s
i
t

solves the utility-maximization
problem of a type-i agent; (ii) given (wt; t), (lt; Kt) solves the prot-maximization
problem of a rm; (iii) given ( wt; Kt), wt solves the Nash bargaining problem; (iv)
the reference wage wt is computed by assuming full employment in the labor market;
(v) given (lt; wt; Rt; Dt), (t; bt; gt; Dt+1) satises the government budget constraint;
(vi) t = Rt holds; (vii) the capital market clears: Dt+1 +Kt+1 = lts
e
t + (1  lt)sut .
In each period, the timing of the events is as follows. First, the government repre-
senting the young and the old decides a scal policy to maximize its objective function
(demonstrated later). Second, wage is determined by the bargaining process, taking as
given that the agents understand how wage aects labor demand. Then, the rm demands
capital and labor, and sets employment according to its labor demand curve. Given a
scal policy, wage, and an interest rate, each young agent sets savings and consumption
to maximize his/her utility. Finally, the capital market clears.
3 Political Equilibrium
To consider the behavior of the government, we need to determine its objective as well
as the agents' indirect utility functions. Recall that V yet , V
yu
t , and V
o
t denote the indirect
utility of a young-employed agent in period t, the indirect utility of a young-unemployed
agent in period t, and the indirect utility of an old agent in period t, respectively. These
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are expressed as functions of government policy and/or the stock of capital as follows:
V yet = (1 + ) ln(1  t)(1  )AKt +  ln gt+1;
V yut = (1 + ) ln bt +  ln gt+1;
V ot =  ln gt;
where some irrelevant terms are omitted from the expressions. The terms (1   t)(1  
)AKt and bt correspond to the lifetime income (and thus lifetime consumption) for the
employed and the unemployed, respectively. The term representing consumption for the
period-t old is omitted from the expression in V ot , because it is predetermined in period
t  1.
This study assumes probabilistic voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) in the
demonstration of the political mechanism (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, Appendix,
and Persson and Tabellini, 2000, pp. 54{58, for an overview of the voting mechanism).
In each period, the government in power chooses scal policy to maximize its political
objective. Formally, the political objective function in period t is given by
Pt = !V
o
t + (1  !) fl  V yet + (1  l)  V yut g ;
or
Pt = ! ln gt + (1  !)(1 + ) [l  ln(1  t)(1  )AKt + (1  l)  ln bt]
+ (1  !) ln gt+1;
where ! and 1 ! are the relative weights of old and young agents, respectively, and l and
1  l are relative weights of the employed and the unemployed measured as a percentage
of the young generation population, respectively.2
The remainder of the analysis proceeds as follows. In this section, we consider the
unbalanced-budget case: the government may borrow or lend in the capital market to
nance its spending or use its surplus funds, respectively. In the next section, we focus
on the balanced-budget case: the government runs no decit and its expenditure is solely
nanced by labor income tax. Then, we compare the two cases in terms of the size of
the government and economic growth to consider economic implications of debt-nanced
government expenditure.
3.1 Unbalanced-Budget Political Equilibrium
The analysis in the present study restricts its attention to a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Markov perfectness implies that the outcomes are history-dependent only on the payo-
relevant state variables, that is, capital K and public debt D. Therefore, the expected
2Appendix B provides the microfoundation of the political objective function.
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level of public services in the next period, gt+1, is given by a function of the next-period
capital stock and public debt, gt+1 = G(Kt+1; Dt+1). Using the recursive notation with x
0
denoting the next period x, we can dene an unbalanced-budget Markov-perfect political
equilibrium as follows.
Denition 2. An unbalanced-budget Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a set of
functions,
D
~T ; ~G; ~B; ~D
E
, where ~T : <++  < ! [0; 1] is a tax rule,  = ~T (K;D); ~G :
<++  < ! <++ is a public goods provision rule, g = ~G(K;D); ~B : <++  < ! <+ is
an unemployment-insurance rule, b = ~B(K;D); and ~D : <++  < ! < is a debt rule,
D0 = ~D(K;D), such that
(i) the capital market clears:
~D(K;D) +K 0 =

1 + 
h
l

1  ~T (K;D)

(1  )AK + (1  l) ~B(K;D)
i
; (9)
(ii) given K and D,
D
~T (K;D); ~G(K;D); ~B(K;D); ~D(K;D)
E
= argmaxP subject to
g0 = ~G(K 0; D0), the capital market clearing condition in (9), and the government
budget constraint,
~G(K;D) + (1  l) ~B(K;D) +RD = ~T (K;D)l(1  )AK + ~D(K;D);
where P is dened by
P (K; g; ; b; g0) = ! ln g+(1 !)(1+) [l ln(1  )(1  )AK + (1  l) ln b]+(1 !) ln g0:
.
The following proposition provides a characterization of the unbalanced-budget polit-
ical equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Given K and D, an unbalanced-budget Markov-perfect political equilib-
rium, f; b; g;K 0; D0g, is characterized by
b = ~B(K;D)  (1  !)(1 + ) (l(1  )A+R)
l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
(l(1  )AK  RD) ;
g = ~G(K;D)  !
(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + ! (l(1  )AK  RD) ;
D0 = ~D(K;D) 
(1  !)
n

1+
(1 +    ) l(1  )A  R
o

l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
(l(1  )AK  RD) ;
 = ~T (K;D) 
8<:  +
(1 )R
l(1 )A  D0K0 for t = 0;
 + (1 )R
l(1 )A 
1+ 
1+
l(1 )A R

1+
l(1 )A+(1+)R for t  1;
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where
  1  (1  !)l(1 + ) (l(1  )A+R)
l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
;
and by the law of motion of capital,
K 0
K
=
(1  !)


1+
l(1  )A+ (1 + )R


l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g

l(1  )A RD
K

;
wherein
D
K
=
( D0
K0
for t = 0;
1+ 
1+
l(1 )A R

1+
l(1 )A+(1+)R for t  1:
The government borrows (lends) in the capital market if and only if  7 ~ 
(1  ) (1 + )= (1 + ).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 implies that the economy has the following three features. First, g and
b are linear functions of wage income l(1   )AK minus debt repayment RD. The
available resources for the government are l(1  )AK  RD, and the government uses
them for expenditure on public services for the old and on unemployment benets for the
young.
Second, the government borrows or lends in the capital market; the state of nancial
balance depends on , which captures the preference weight of public services for the
old. A higher  incentivizes the young voters to lower public debt from the viewpoint of
maintaining public services they will enjoy in their old age. This is the disciplined eect
produced by the young voters (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2012). In particular,
when  is above ~, the disciplinary eect is so large that the government does not need
bond issues. Rather, the government lends in the capital market to utilize its surplus
funds.
Third, the growth rate is constant across periods except for the initial period. This
is because the model exhibits a constant interest rate inherited from the AK technology.
However, the growth rate changes between the rst two periods, that is, periods 0 and
1, because the government starts to borrow or lend in the capital market in period 0. In
particular, the growth rate decreases when the government borrows in the capital market.
The issue of public bonds by the period-0 government pushes the next-period government
to raise taxes to nance debt repayment. In addition, the issue of public bonds crowds
out capital accumulation and thus impedes economic growth. The opposite result holds
when the government lends in the capital market.
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3.2 Political Powers of the Old and the Trade Union
Based on the result in Proposition 1, we now investigate how policies and the growth rate
are aected by increased power of the old and the trade union. The following proposition
summarizes the result.
Proposition 2. In an unbalanced-budget political equilibrium, increases in ! and 
cause the following:
(i) @ (D=Y ) =@! = 0; @=@! > 0; @ (g=Y ) =@! > 0; @ ((1  l)b=Y ) =@! < 0, and @ (K 0=K) =@! <
0;
(ii) @ (D=Y ) =@ > 0; @=@ > 0; @ (g=Y ) =@ = 0; @ ((1  l)b=Y ) =@ > 0, and @ (K 0=K) =@ <
0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
To understand the result in Proposition 2, we rst consider the D=Y ratio. This is
rewritten as D=Y = (D=K)=A(l)1 , where D=K is independent of ! and . The employ-
ment rate l is independent of the political power of the elderly, because it is determined to
balance the conicting items between the young workers and the trade union. However,
the employment rate decreases as the political power of the union is strengthened. This
in turn decreases the aggregate output and thus increases the D=Y ratio.
Second, consider the tax rate. The tax rate increases as the political power of the
old is strengthened, because the old owe no tax burden and thus want to increase public
services for the old at the expense of a nancial burden on the young. The tax rate also
increases as the bargaining power of the union increases. Greater bargaining power of the
union lowers the employment rate. In response to this change, the government raises the
tax rate on the employed to maintain the tax revenue level.
Third, g=Y increases but (1   l)b=Y decreases as the political weight of the old in-
creases. A larger weight on the old incentivizes the government to shift resources from
the young (including the unemployed) to the old, resulting in a higher g=Y and a lower
(1   l)b=Y . The relative bargaining strength has no eect on g=Y , because its eect on
the policy function of g is oset by its eect on the aggregate output Y . However, the
relative bargaining strength has a positive eect on (1   l)b=Y , because increased union
power decreases the number of employed, and thus increases the aggregate spending on
unemployment-insurance payments.
Finally, the growth rate of capital decreases as the political weight of the old increases.
A larger weight on the old makes the government pay more attention to the old, and thus
spend more resources on public services for the old, resulting in less resources for savings
and capital accumulation. The bargaining power of the union has two opposing eects on
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the growth rate: a higher markup, , and a lower number of employed. The result suggests
that the latter negative eect always outweighs the former positive eect, resulting in a
lower growth rate in response to an increase in the power of the union.
A noteworthy feature of the result in Proposition 2 is that a greater power of the union
leads to a higher unemployment rate and a higher debt-to-GDP ratio, suggesting a positive
correlation between these two variables. This is in line with previous studies' predictions,
such as Kaas and von Thadden (2004; who demonstrate a positive correlation under
capital shortage) and Battaglini and Coate (2014; who show the pro-cyclical behavior
of unemployment and debt arising from time-varying productivity). The present study
presents an alternative approach to explain this positive correlation and may be viewed
as complementary to these previous works.
4 Impact of Debt Finance
In the previous section, we considered scal policy and economic growth when the gov-
ernment is able to issue bonds to nance its expenditure. Although the unemployment
rate is independent of scal policy and capital accumulation in the present framework, the
issue of public bonds aects the size of the government and economic growth, as demon-
strated in the previous section. In order to investigate the impact of the debt-nanced
government spending, here, we consider an alternative case|the balanced-budget case,
where the government spending is solely nanced by labor income tax. Then, we com-
pare the two cases, the balanced- and unbalanced-budget cases, in terms of government
expenditure, g=Y and (1  l)b=Y , and economic growth, K 0=K.
4.1 Balanced-Budget Political Equilibrium
In the balanced-budget case, capital K is the only payo-relevant state variable. The
expected level of public services in the next period, g0, is given by a function of the next-
period capital stock, K 0 : g0 = G(K 0). Therefore, the balanced-budget Markov-perfect
political equilibrium is dened as follows.
Denition 3. A balanced-budget Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a set of functions,
hT;G;Bi, where T : <++ ! [0; 1] is a tax rule,  = T (K), G : <++ ! <++ is a
public services provision rule, g = G(K), and B : <++ ! <+ is an unemployment-
insurance rule, b = B(K), such that
(i) the capital market clears:
K 0 =

1 + 
[l (1  T (K))(1  )AK + (1  l)B(K)] ; (10)
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(ii) givenK, hT (K); G(K); B(K)i = argmaxP (K; ; g; b; g0) subject to g0 = G(K 0), (10),
and the government budget constraint,
G(K) + (1  l)B(K) = T (K)l(1  )AK;
where P () is dened by
P (K; g; ; b; g0)  ! ln g + (1  !)(1 + ) [l  ln(1  )(1  )AK + (1  l)  ln b]
+ (1  !) ln g0:
The following proposition provides a characterization of the balanced-budget political
equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Given K, a balanced-budget Markov-perfect political equilibrium,
f; b; g;K 0g, is characterized by the policy functions,
g = G(K)  !
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + ! l(1  )AK;
b = B(K)  (1  !)(1 + (1 + ))
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + ! l(1  )AK;
 = T (K)  (1  l)(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + !
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + ! ;
as well as by the law of motion of capital,
K 0 =

1 + 
 (1  !)(1 + (1 + ))
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + !  l(1  )AK:
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The result in Proposition 3 indicates that the balanced-budget political equilibrium
diers from the unbalanced-budget political equilibrium in the following two points. First,
g and b are linear functions of wage income, w = l(1  )AK. Second, the growth rate
of capital is constant across periods. There is no change in the growth rate from period
0 to period 1 because there is no issue of public bonds that aects the state of nancial
balance. To investigate the dierence in more detail, we compare the two cases in terms
of government expenditure, g=Y and (1  l)b=Y , and economic growth, K 0=K, in the next
subsection.
4.2 Comparing the Balanced- and Unbalanced-Budget Cases
Let xjbalanced and xjunbalanced denote a variable x in the balanced- and unbalanced-budget
cases, respectively. Let us rst compare the two cases in period 0. We set D0 = 0 to
compare the two cases under the same initial condition.
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Proposition 4. Assume D0 = 0. For period t = 0, K1=K0, g0=Y0, and (1  l)b0=Y0 in
the balanced- and unbalanced-budget cases are compared as follows:
K1
K0

balanced
? K1
K0

unbalanced
if and only if  7 ~ (, D1 ? 0) ;
g0
Y0

balanced
=
g0
Y0

unbalanced
;
(1  l)b0
Y0

balanced
7 (1  l)b0
Y0

unbalanced
if and only if  7 ~ (, D1 ? 0) :
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Proposition 4 implies that whether the growth rate in the unbalanced-budget case is
higher or lower than that in the balanced-budget case, depends on the state of nancial
balance. When  < ~ such that the government borrows in the capital market, public
debt crowds out private investment and thus capital formation. The growth rate in the
unbalanced-budget economy is lower than that in the balanced-budget economy. However,
when  > ~ such that the government lends in the capital market, state lending enables
the rms to invest more, enhancing capital formation. Therefore, the preference weight of
public services for the old, denoted by , is key to determining the relative performance of
the unbalanced-budget case compared to the balanced-budget case in terms of economic
growth.
To understand the eects of budget balance on public services for the old and unemployment-
insurance payments, we should note that the available resources for the initial-period
government is labor income l(1  )AK for both cases, because there is no debt repay-
ment in this period. However, in the unbalanced-budget case, the government can either
lend or borrow in the capital market, which aects the government budget and thus the
composition of government expenditure. In particular, the government adjusts its expen-
diture by controlling unemployment-insurance payments while keeping public services for
the old unchanged to maximize its objective. Therefore, the budget balance aects the
unemployment-insurance payments-to-GDP ratio but has no eect on the public services-
to-GDP ratio in the initial period.
Next, we compare the growth rate and the public-services-to-GDP ratio for the two
cases in period t( 1).
Proposition 5. For period t  1, Kt+1=Kt and gt=Yt in the balanced- and unbalanced-
budget cases are compared as follows:
Kt+1
Kt

balanced
? Kt+1
Kt

unbalanced
if and only if  7 ~ (, Dt+1 ? 0) ;
gt
Yt

balanced
? gt
Yt

unbalanced
if and only if  7 ~ (, Dt+1 ? 0) :
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Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The eect on economic growth as to whether the budget is balanced is identical to that
in the initial period. However, the eect on public services in period t  1 diers from
that in the initial period. The level of public services is independent of whether the budget
is balanced in the initial period, whereas it is critically aected by this balance for period
t  1. To understand this dierence, recall that for period t  1, the available resources
for the government in the unbalanced-budget case are given by l(1   )AK   RD,
which are smaller (larger) than those in the balanced-budget case when the government
borrows (lends) in the capital market, that is, when  < (>)~. Because of this dierence
in available resources, the public services-to-GDP ratio in the unbalanced-budget case
decreases or increases relative to the balanced-budget case.
Finally, we compare the unemployment-insurance payments-to-GDP ratio in period
t( 1).
Proposition 6. For period t  1, there are two critical values of , denoted by ^1and
^2 (where 0 < ^1 < ^2), respectively, such that
(1  l)bt
Yt

balanced
<
(1  l)bt
Yt

unbalanced
for  2 (^1; ^2) ;
(1  l)bt
Yt

balanced
 (1  l)bt
Yt

unbalanced
for   ^1 or ^2  ;
with equality holding if  = ^1 or ^2.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The unemployment-insurance payments are directly aected by the state of nancial
balance in the initial period, but these eects are not straightforward for period t  1. To
understand the eect in period t  1 in more detail, we use the results in Propositions 1
and 3 to compute (1  l)bt=Ytjbalanced and (1  l)bt=Ytjunbalanced for period t  1 as follows:
(1  l)bt
Yt

balanced
= (1  l)(1  !)(1  )
(b:1)z }| {
1 + (1 + )
(1  !) (1 + (1 + ))| {z }
(b:2)
+ !|{z}
(b:3)
; (11)
(1  l)bt
Yt

unbalanced
=
(1  l)(1  !)(1 + )
1 
1+
+ 

(1  )   
2664
(u:1)z }| {
1

1+
(1  ) + (1 + )   1
3775
(1  !) (1 + (1 + ))| {z }
(u:2)
+ !|{z}
(u:3)
:
(12)
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These expressions indicate that the parameter , representing the preferences of the public
services for the old, aects the unemployment-insurance payment-to-GDP ratio for both
cases.
In the balanced-budget case, there are three eects on the ratio, observed by terms
(b.1), (b.2), and (b.3). To understand the eects of  through these terms, recall that
future public services, g0, is positively related to future capital, k0. Given this property,
the government tends to increase the savings of the unemployed in response to an increase
in . Accordingly, the government shifts the allocation of its spending from public services
for the current old to unemployment-insurance payments for the unemployed young. This
eect is observed by the term (b.1). The term (b.2) indicates that a larger weight on the
future public services has a negative eect at the same time, because an increase in 
incentivizes the government to increase the savings of the employed by cutting their tax
burden, that is, spending on the unemployment-insurance payments.
The term (b.3) represents the weight of the public services for the current old. The
term implies that the government shifts its allocation of spending from unemployment-
insurance payments to public services for the current old in response to an increase in .
Overall, there is one positive eect observed by the term (b.1), and two negative eects
observed by the terms (b.2) and (b.3). However, the sum of the two negative eects always
outweighs the positive eect in the present setting. Therefore, in the balanced-budget case
the unemployment-insurance payment-to-GDP ratio decreases as  increases.
The unbalanced-budget case is also distinguished by one positive eect observed by
the term (u.1) and two negative eects observed by the terms (u.2) and (u.3). The two
negative eects correspond to those in the balanced-budget case. However, the positive
eect observed in the unbalanced-budget case is qualitatively dierent from that in the
balanced-budget case. In particular, the term (u.1) shows a disciplinary eect exercised by
the young voters (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2012). The young agents' concern for
future public services controls current scal policy and thus prevents the government from
issuing too many public bonds. This in turn results in a decrease in the debt-repayment
cost, and thus an increase in the unemployment-insurance payments. These opposing
eects produce an initial increase followed by a decrease in the unemployment-insurance
payment-to-GDP ratio in response to an increase in .
Figure 1 demonstrates the unemployment-insurance payment-to-GDP ratios in the
balanced- and unbalanced-budget cases. The vertical line in the gure is the critical value
of , ~, that determines the state of nancial balance in the unbalanced-budget case. The
government borrows in the capital market when  < ~ (Proposition 1). Therefore, there
is a range of ; (^1; ~), such that the shift from the government borrowing to a balanced
budget yields a decrease in the unemployment-insurance payment-to-GDP ratio. In other
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words, the shift increases the growth rate and the spending for the old-to-GDP ratio
(Proposition 5), but may decrease the unemployment-insurance payments-to-GDP ratio.
This result suggests that the balanced-budget requirement, which has been or is being
introduced in some countries for scal discipline, is benecial in terms of economic growth
but may benet the old at the expense of the unemployed young.
[Figure 1 here.]
5 Discussion, Extensions, and Directions for Future
Research
In the main analysis of this paper, we assumed that (i) unemployment-insurance benets
are exempted from taxation; and (ii) the reservation wage of the union is the competitive
wage. In this section, we briey examine how the analysis and results would change
if either of these assumptions is relaxed. We also mention unresolved issues and some
avenues for future research.
5.1 Taxation on Unemployment-Insurance Benets
Suppose that unemployment-insurance benets are subject to income taxation. The tax
base for the government is l(1 )AK +(1  l)b, where l(1 )AK is aggregate labor
income and (1  l)b is aggregate unemployment-insurance benets. Taxation reduces the
available resources for the employed and unemployed, thus reducing their consumption
and raising the cost of taxation in terms of utility. The cost is given by (1   !)(1 +
) ln(l(1   )AK + (1   l)b), where 1   ! is the political power of the young, 1 +  is
the discount factor, and ln(l(1  )AK + (1  l)b) is the utility of consumption.
Taxation provides benets for the unemployed through the provision of unemployment-
insurance benets. The benet of taxation in terms of utility is given by (1  l)(1 !)(1+
) ln b, where 1 l is the share of the unemployed in the population and ln b is the utility of
consumption produced by the provision of unemployment-insurance benets, the level of
which, b, is determined through voting to equate the marginal cost and benet of taxation.
Through calculation, we nd that this equation is b = (1  )AK = w regardless of the
nancial balance status of the government (see Appendix A.6 for the proof). The result
implies that the employed and unemployed obtain the same income level before and after
taxation.
This result heavily depends on the specication of the political weights in the gov-
ernment's objective function. In the present framework, the relative weights of the em-
ployed and unemployed are their share in the population, l and 1   l, respectively. If
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the weight is biased toward the unemployed (employed), the level of unemployment-
insurance benets becomes higher (lower) than the wage income for the employed. For
example, let l and (1   l)(1 + ") denote the weights of the employed and unemployed,
respectively, where " shows a bias towards the unemployed (employed) if " > (<)0.
Under this alternative setting, the level of unemployment-insurance benets is set at
b = (1 + ")(1   )AK = (1 + ")w through voting. Therefore, the unemployed receive
benets greater (lower) than the wage for the employed if " > (<)0.
5.2 An Alternative Form of the Union's Objective Function
In the main analysis, we assumed that the reservation wage for the union is the compet-
itive wage. Alternatively, we assume that the reservation wage is given by the level of
unemployment-insurance benets, bt (see, e.g., Bean and Pissarides, 1993; Chang, Shaw,
and Lai, 2007). The union's objective under this alternative assumption is ((1  t)wt   bt) (lt)1 .
The objective function in the Nash bargaining problem is now modied as

t =
h
((1  t)wt   bt) (lt)1 
i
 At (Kt) (lt)1    wtlt1  ;
and the solution to the problem becomes
(1  t)wt = bt;
where (> 1) is dened in (4).
The indirect utility functions of the employed and the unemployed are now given by
V yet = (1 + ) lnbt +  lnRt+1 +  ln gt+1;
V yut = (1 + ) ln bt +  lnRt+1 +  ln gt+1;
respectively. An increase in b improves the utility of both the employed and the unem-
ployed. That is, there is no conict over the provision of unemployment-insurance benets
between the employed and the unemployed, which is empirically implausible. Therefore,
the present study uses the competitive wage as the reservation wage for the union.
5.3 Unresolved Issues and Future Directions
The present study shows that there is a positive correlation between unemployment and
the debt-to-GDP ratio resulting from the strong political power of a trade union. The
study also shows that the balanced-budget requirement improves economic growth but
may shift resources from the unemployed young to the old via scal policy. In other
words, the requirement may benet the old at the expense of the unemployed young.
19
Several assumptions are made to demonstrate these results. In particular, the key
assumptions are (i) the logarithmic utility function that produces a savings function inde-
pendent of the interest rate; and (ii) AK technology that produces a constant interest rate.
These assumptions enable us to obtain an analytical solution while abstracting from some
complicating factors. In addition, because of the specication of the collective wage bar-
gaining that accompanies these two assumptions, the unemployment rate is independent
of capital. In other words, the present model demonstrates an eect of unemployment
on scal policy and economic growth but fails to show the mutual interaction between
them. Furthermore, the study focuses on a specic balanced-budget requirement and its
implication for scal policy and economic growth. An alternative budget rule (like the
one in Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate, 2015) and its implication for welfare are merely
abstracted from the analysis. These issues are left for the future.
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A Proofs
A.1 Bargaining Solution
We substitute the constraint into the objective function to obtain the following uncon-
strained problem:
max
wt

t =
h
f(1  )Atg(1 )= (Kt)1 
i

h
f(1  )Atg1= (1=(1  )  1)Kt
i1 
 ~
t;
where ~
t  (wt   wt)  (wt) f(1 )+(1 )(1 )g=. Therefore, the problem is reduced to
max
wt
~
t  (wt   wt)  (wt) 
(1 )+(1 )(1 )

given wt:
The rst derivative of ~
t with respect to wt is
@ ~
t
@wt
= (wt   wt) 1(wt) 
(1 )+(1 )(1 )

 1

wt   (1  ) + (1  )(1  )

(wt   wt)

;
indicating that @ ~
t=@wt = 0 implies wt =  wt, where  is dened in Section 2. The
second derivative of ~
t with respect to wt, evaluated at @ ~
t=@wt = 0, is
@2 ~
t
@w2t

@ ~
t=@wt=0
= (wt   wt) 1(wt) 
(1 )+(1 )(1 )

 1

   (1  ) + (1  )(1  )


;
where @2 ~
t=@w
2
t

@ ~
t=@wt=0
< 0 holds under Assumption 1.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To nd a set of policy functions, let us rst recall the government budget constraint in
Denition 2(ii), which can be rewritten as follows:
1   = l(1  )AK   g   (1  l)b RD +D
0
l(1  )AK :
Using this constraint, the capital market-clearing condition can be rewritten as
D0 +K 0 =

1 + 
[(l(1  )AK  RD)  g +D0] ; (13)
where D0 appearing on the left-hand side indicates borrowing (lending) by the government
if D0 > (<)0, whereas D0 appearing on the right-hand side implies the benets (costs)
arising from the shift of scal resources from taxes to public bonds if D0 > (<)0.
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To nd the policy functions that maximize the political objective, P , we need to
conjecture the future policy function g0 = ~G(K 0; D0). Here, we conjecture that g0 =
G0  (l(1  )AK 0  RD0), where G0(> 0) is constant. The term l(1   )AK 0   RD0
in the conjecture shows the aggregate labor income minus debt repayment, and implies
the resources available to the government. Plugging the capital market-clearing condition
(13) into this conjecture, we obtain
g0 = G0 

l(1  )A 
1 + 
f(l(1  )AK  RD)  gg  

l(1  )A
1 + 
+R

D0

:
Using this guessing function, the political objective function can now be reformulated as
follows:
P = ! ln g + (1  !)(1 + )l ln [l(1  )AK   g   (1  l)b RD +D0]
+ (1  !)(1 + )(1  l) ln b
+ (1  !) ln

l(1  )A 
1 + 
f(l(1  )AK  RD)  gg  

l(1  )A
1 + 
+R

D0

;
where the terms unrelated to political decisions are omitted from the expression.
The rst-order conditions with respect to b, g, and D0 are summarized as
b = ~B(K;D)  (1  !)(1 + ) (l(1  )A+R)
l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
(l(1  )AK  RD) ;
(14)
g = ~G(K;D)  !
(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + ! (l(1  )AK  RD) ; (15)
D0 = ~D(K;D) 
(1  !)
n

1+
(1 +    ) l(1  )A  R
o

l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
(l(1  )AK  RD) :
(16)
These functions constitute a Markov-perfect political equilibrium as long as G0 = ! 
f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g 1. Derivations of (14){(16) are provided in Appendix B.2.
Using these policy functions, we compute the tax rate. Recall the government budget
constraint,
 =
g + (1  l)b+RD  D0
l(1  )AK :
Plugging (14){(16) into this expression and rearranging the terms, we obtain the following:
 = +
(1  )R
l(1  )A 
D
K
; (17)
where
  1  (1  !)l(1 + ) (l(1  )A+R)
l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
:
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To determine the tax rate, we need to compute D=K. This is completed using the
policy function D0 = D(K;D) and the capital market-clearing condition K 0 = K(K;D).
We substitute the policy functions of D0 and g, given by (16) and (15), respectively, into
the capital market-clearing condition (13), and rearrange the terms to obtain
K 0 =
(1  !)


1+
l(1  )A+ (1 + )R


l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
(l(1  )AK  RD) : (18)
Using (16) and (18), we can compute the ratio D=K as follows:
D
K
=
(
D0=K0 for t = 0;
1+ 
1+
l(1 )A R

1+
l(1 )A+(1+)R for t  1;
(19)
where D0=K0 is an initial condition and is taken as given. Using (18) and (19), we obtain
the growth rate K 0=K. The expression implies that Dt ? 0 for t  1 if and only if
1+ 
1+
l(1  )A  R ? 0, that is,  7 ~  (1  )(1 + )=(1 + ).
Plugging (19) into (17), we obtain the tax rate:
 =
8<:  +
(1 )R
l(1 )A  D0K0 for t = 0;
 + (1 )R
l(1 )A 
1+ 
1+
l(1 )A R

1+
l(1 )A+(1+)R for t  1:
(20)
The derivations of (19) and (20) are provided in Appendix B.2.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
A.3.1 Eect of ! and  on D=Y
Given Yt = AlKt, Dt=Yt can be rewritten as
Dt
Yt
=
Dt
Kt
 1
Al
:
The rst term, D=K, can be rewritten as
Dt
Kt
=
(
D0=K0 for t = 0;
1+ 
1+
l(1 )A R

1+
l(1 )A+(1+)R =
1+ 
1+
(1 ) 

1+
(1 )+(1+) for t  1;
;
where the second equality in the second line comes from R = Al. Dt=Kt is independent
of ! and  for t  0, as observed in the previous expression, @(Dt=Kt)=@! = 0, and
@(Dt=Kt)=@ = 0 for t  0:
The term 1=Al on the right-hand side of the expression, D=Y = (D=K)  (1=Al),
can be rewritten as
1
Al
=
1
A
()1= 1 ;
where the equality arises from l = (1=)1=. Given @=@! = 0 and @=@ > 0, we obtain
@(D=Y )=@! = 0 and @(D=Y )=@ > 0 for t  0.
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A.3.2 Eects of ! and  on 
The tax rate, given by (17), can be rewritten as follows:
 =   (1  ) 

1  R
l(1  )A 
D
K

+ (1  )
= 1  (1  ) 

1  R
l(1  )A 
D
K

= 1  (1  !)l(1 + ) (l(1  )A+ lA)
l(1 )A
1+
+ lA

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g


1  Al
l(1  )A 
D
K

;
where the third line is from the denition of  and R = Al. The expression is reduced
to
 = 1  (1  !)l(1 + )
(1 )
1+
+ 

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g


1  
(1  ) 
D
K

:
Given @(D=Y )=@! = 0 and @(D=Y )=@ > 0(in Section A.3.1), and @l=@! = 0 and
@l=@ < 0, we obtain @=@! > 0 and @=@ > 0 for t  0.
A.3.3 Eects of ! and  on g=Y
Using the policy function g = ~G(K;D) in (15), we can write g=Y as follows:
g
Y
=
1
AlK
 !
(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !  lA  f(1  )K   Dg
=
!
(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + ! 

(1  )  D
K

:
Given @(D=K)=@! = 0 and @(D=K)=@ = 0 (in Section A.3.1), we obtain @ (g=Y ) =@! >
0 and @ (g=Y ) =@ = 0 for t  0.
A.3.4 Eects of ! and  on (1  l)b=Y
Using the policy function b = ~B(K;D) in Eq. (14), we can write (1  l)b=Y as follows:
(1  l)b
Y
=
1  l
AlK
 (1  !)(1 + ) (l(1  )A+R)
l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
 fl(1  )K  RDg
=
(1  l)(1  !)(1 + )
1 
1+
+ 

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g


(1  )  D
K

:
Given that @l=@! = 0 and @l=@ < 0, and @(D=K)=@! = 0 and @(D=K)=@ > 0 (in
Section A.3.1), we obtain @ ((1  l)b=Y ) =@! < 0 and @ ((1  l)b=Y ) =@ > 0 for t  0.
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A.3.5 Eect on K 0=K
For t = 0, the growth rate demonstrated in Proposition 1 can be rewritten as
K1
K0
=
(1  !)


1+
(1  ) + (1 + )


1 
1+
+ 

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
()1 1= (1  )A:
Given @=@! = 0 and @=@ > 0, we obtain @ (K1=K0) =@! < 0 and @ (K1=K0) =@ < 0.
For t  1, the growth rate can be rewritten as
Kt+1
Kt
=
(1  !)
(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + ! ()
1 1=A;
indicating that @ (Kt+1=Kt) =@! < 0 and @ (Kt+1=Kt) =@ < 0.

A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
To nd a set of policy functions, let us rst recall the government budget constraint in
Denition 2(ii), which can be rewritten as
1   = l(1  )AK   g   (1  l)b
l(1  )AK : (21)
Plugging (21) into the capital market-clearing condition (10), we obtain
K 0 =

1 + 
[l(1  )AK   g] :
Conjecture a linear policy function of public services in the next period as g0 = G0 K 0,
or
g0 = G0  
1 + 
[l(1  )AK   g] ;
where G0(> 0) is a constant parameter. Given this conjecture and the government budget
constraint in (21), we can write the political objective function as follows:
P = ! ln g + (1  !)(1 + )l ln [l(1  )AK   g   (1  l)b]
+ (1  !)(1 + )(1  l) ln b+ (1  !) ln (l(1  )AK   g) ,
where the terms unrelated to policy are omitted from the expression.
The rst-order conditions with respect to g and b are summarized as
g = G(K)  !
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + ! l(1  )AK; (22)
b = B(K)  (1  !)(1 + (1 + ))
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + ! l(1  )AK: (23)
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These functions constitute a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium as long as
G0 = !l(1  )A= f(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + !g holds.
We substitute the policy functions (22) and (23) into the government budget constraint
in (21) to obtain the equilibrium tax rate:
 = T (K)  (1  l)(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + !
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + ! : (24)
We substitute (22) and (24) into the capital market-clearing condition to obtain the law
of motion of capital:
K 0 =

1 + 
 (1  !)(1 + (1 + ))
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + !  l(1  )AK: (25)

A.5 Proofs of Propositions 4, 5, and 6
First, consider the growth rate of capital. Recall that the growth rate in the balanced-
budget case is computed using (25), and that in the unbalanced-budget case is given by
(18). By direct comparison, we can nd that
Kt+1
Kt

balanced
? Kt+1
Kt

unbalanced
,  7 ~ for all t  0:
Next, consider spending for the old-to-GDP ratio. From (22) and (15), g=Y jbalanced
and g=Y junbalanced are computed as
g
Y

balanced
=
!
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + ! (1  ); and
g
Y

unbalanced
=
!
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + !

(1  )  D
K

;
respectively. Given the assumption of D0 = 0, we immediately nd that g0=Y0jbalanced =
g0=Y0junbalanced holds. For t  1, direct calculation yields
g=Y jbalanced ? g=Y junbalanced , D0 ? 0,  7 ~;
where the last identity comes from the result in Proposition 1.
Finally, consider the unemployment-insurance payments-to-GDP ratio. Using (23)
and (14), we can compute (1  l)b=Y jbalanced and (1  l)b=Y junbalanced as
(1  l)b
Y

balanced
=
(1  l)(1  !)(1 + (1 + ))
(1  !)(1 + (1 + )) + ! (1  ); and
(1  l)b
Y

unbalanced
=
(1  l)(1  !)(1 + )
(1 )
1+
+ 

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g

(1  )  D
K

;
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respectively.
Given the assumption of the initial condition, D0 = 0, we have
(1  l)b0
Y0

balanced
7 (1  l)b0
Y0

unbalanced
,  7 ~:
For t  1, we compare (1  l)bt=Ytjbalanced and (1  l)bt=Ytjunbalanced, and obtain
(1  l)bt
Yt

balanced
? (1  l)bt
Yt

unbalanced
, (1 + (1 + )) (1 ) ? 1 + 1 
1+
+ 

(1  )  D
K

:
(26)
Plugging the ratio D=K in (19) into (26) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
(1  l)bt
Yt

balanced
? (1  l)bt
Yt

unbalanced
, (1  ) (1 + (1 + ))| {z }
LHS
? 1 + 1 
1+
+ 

241  
 +

1 
1+
+ 


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| {z }
RHS
; (27)
where the terms LHS and RHS have the following properties:
LHSj=0 = (1  ) (1 + ) ; lim!1LHS = +1; @LHS=@ > 0; @
2LHS=@2 = 0;
RHSj=0 = 0; lim!1RHS =
1 + 
1 
1+
+ 
; @RHS=@ > 0; @2RHS=@2 < 0:
LHS and RHS are illustrated in Figure A.1, where the horizontal axis represents .
[Figure A.1 here.]
The properties of LHS and RHS indicate that there is a critical value of , denoted
by ^, such that the following holds:
@LHS=@j=^ = @RHS=@j=^ ;
where ^ is dened by
^ 

(1+)
(1 )
1=2
  
1 
1+
+ 
:
At  = ^; we have
RHSj=^ > LHSj=^ ,  +  > 2 [(1  )(1 + )]1=2
, [(  ) + 2]2 > 0;
where the last inequality holds for any  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1). Therefore, there are two
critical values of , denoted by ^1 and ^2, such that LHS > RHS for  < ^1 or ^2 < ,
and LHS < RHS for  2 (^1; ^2) as illustrated in Figure A.1.

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A.6 Taxation on Unemployment-Insurance Benets
When the unemployment-insurance benets are subject to a labor-income tax, type-i's
budget constraint in youth is given by cyi + si  x(1  )w + (1  x)(1  )b. Given this
constraint, we solve the utility-maximization problem of each type of agent and compute
the indirect utility function as follows:
V yi =

V ye = (1 + ) ln(1  )w +  lnR0 +  ln g0;
V yu = (1 + ) ln(1  )b+  lnR0 +  ln g0:
The government budget constraint is
g + (1  l)b+RD =  lw + (1  l)b+D0;
where (1   l)b on the right-hand side is the revenue from taxation on unemployment-
insurance benets. The capital market-clearing condition becomes
D0 +K 0 =

1 + 
fl(1  )(1  )AK + (1  l)(1  )bg :
In these two expressions, Dt = 0 for all t under a balanced budget.
The political objective function is now given by
Pt = fl + (1  l)(1 + ")g! ln g
+ (1  !)(1 + ) [l ln(1  )(1  )AK + (1  l)(1 + ") ln(1  )b]
+ fl + (1  l)(1 + ")g(1  !) ln g0;
where " represents a political bias toward the unemployed (the employed) if " > (<)0.
Following the same procedure in the main analysis, we solve the maximization problem of
the government subject to the government budget constraint, the capital market-clearing
condition, and the future policy function conjecture.
Suppose that the government runs a balanced budget in every period. Plugging the
government budget constraint into the capital market-clearing condition, we obtain
K 0 =

1 + 
(l(1  )AK   g) :
Given an estimate of the future policy function, g0 = G0  K 0, where G0 is constant, we
solve the government's problem and obtain b = (1 + ")(1  )AK = (1 + ")w.
Alternatively, consider an unbalanced-budget case. Following the same procedure,
we obtain the capital market-clearing condition that includes the government budget
constraint:
D0 +K 0 =

1 + 
[l(1  )AK   g  RD +D0] :
Given an estimate of the future policy function, g0 = G1  (l(1  )AK 0  RD0), where
G1(> 0) is constant, we solve the government's problem and obtain b = (1 + ")(1  
)AK = (1 + ")w.
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B Supplementary Materials (Not for Publication)
This appendix explains the micro-foundation of the political objective function in Section
B.1 and presents the derivation details of (14){(16) in Section B.2 and (19) and (20) in
Section B.3.
B.1 Probabilistic Voting
The following presentation focuses on the unbalanced-budget case. The same argument
also holds for the balanced-budget case.
Recall that the population of each generation has a unit measure, and that a young
generation consists of two groups of voters, the employed with a fraction of l and the
unemployed with a fraction of 1   l. The old generation also consists of two groups,
agents who were employed in youth and those who were unemployed in youth. However,
these two types of old agents are included in a single group of voters, because they have
the same policy preferences over public services.
The electoral competition takes place between two oce-seeking candidates, L (left)
and R (right). Each candidate announces a policy vector (; g; b) under the unbalanced-
budget rule, subject to the government budget constraint. Elections are held in every
period, so the candidates today cannot make credible promises over future policies.
Let V o, V ye, and V yu denote the indirect utility functions of the old, the employed
young, and the unemployed young, respectively. An old voter prefers candidate R over
L if given the inherited capital and debt, K and D, respectively, the following condition
holds:
V o
 
pL;K;D

< V o
 
pR;K;D

+ io + ;
where pL (pR) is the policy vector proposed by candidate L (R). Likewise, given K and
D and the equilibrium policy functions
D
~T ; ~G; ~B; ~D
E
, an employed young voter prefers
candidate R over L if
V ye

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

< V ye

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

+ ie + ;
and an unemployed young voter prefers candidate R over L if
V yu

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

< V yu

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

+ iu + :
ij (where j 2 fo; e; ug) is an individual-specic parameter drawn from a symmetric
group-specic distribution that is assumed to be uniform in support [ 1=2j; 1=2j]. It
measures voter i's individual ideological bias toward candidate R. Intuitively, a positive
(negative) ij implies that voter i has a bias in favor of party R (L). The parameter 
measures the relative popularity of candidate R in the population, which is assumed to
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be uniform in support [ 1=2 ; 1=2 ] with density  . Therefore, the sum of the terms ij
and  captures the relative appeal of candidate R.
To compute the vote share of each candidate, we identify the swing voter in group
j 2 fo; e; ug, that is, a voter whose ideological bias, given the candidate's platforms,
makes him indierent between the two parties:
o = V o
 
pL;K;D
  V o  pR;K;D  ;
j = V yj

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V yj

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

  ; j = e; u:
All voters i in group j with ij > j prefer party R. Hence, given the distributional
assumptions, candidate R's actual vote share, R, is
R =
1
2

o 

1
2o
   V o  pL;K;D  V o  pR;K;D  
+ le 

1
2e
 

V ye

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V ye

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

  

+(1  l)u 

1
2u
 

V yu

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V yu

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

  

:
Candidate R's probability of winning the election is
Prob

R  1
2

= Prob

  ^  1
o + le + (1  l)u 

o   V o  pL;K;D  V o  pR;K;D
+ le 

V ye

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V ye

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

+(1  l)u 

V yu

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V yu

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D
i
=
1
2
+
 
o + le + (1  l)u 

o   V o  pL;K;D  V o  pR;K;D
+ le 

V ye

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V ye

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

+(1  l)u 

V yu

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V yu

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D
i
=
1
2
+ !   V o  pL;K;D  V o  pR;K;D
+ (1  !) 
h
l 

V ye

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V ye

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

+(1  l) 

V yu

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V yu

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D
i
;
where e = u is assumed, and ! is dened as
!   
o
o + le + (1  l)u :
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Because both candidates seek to maximize their probability of winning the election,
the Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following equation:
 
pL

= max
pL
8>><>>:
!   V o  pL;K;D  V o  pR;K;D
+(1  !) 
h
l 

V ye

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V ye

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

+(1  l) 

V yu

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V yu

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D
i
9>>=>>; ;
 
pR

= max
pR
8>><>>:
!   V o  pL;K;D  V o  pR;K;D
+(1  !) 
h
l 

V ye

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V ye

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D

+(1  l) 

V yu

pL; ~G
 
pL

;K;D

  V yu

pR; ~G
 
pR

;K;D
i
9>>=>>; :
Therefore, the two candidates' platforms converge in equilibrium to the same scal policy
that maximizes the weighted-average utility of the old, the employed young, and the
unemployed young, !V o+(1  !)  (lV ye + (1  l)V yu) subject to the government budget
constraint. This is the political objective function given in the main body of the paper.
B.2 Derivations of (14){(16)
The rst-order conditions with respect to b, g, and D0 are as follows:
b : (1  !) (1 + ) l  1  l
l(1  )AK   g   (1  l)b RD +D0 = (1  !) (1 + ) (1  l) 
1
b
;
g : !  1
g
= (1  !) (1 + ) l  1
l(1  )AK   g   (1  l)b RD +D0
+ (1  !)   l(1  )A

1+
l(1  )A 
1+
fl(1  )AK  RD   gg  

l(1 )A
1+
+R

D0
;
D0 : (1  !) (1 + ) l  1
l(1  )AK   g   (1  l)b RD +D0
= (1  !)  
l(1 )A
1+
+R
l(1  )A 
1+
fl(1  )AK  RD   gg  

l(1 )A
1+
+R

D0
:
From the rst-order condition with respect to b, we have
b = (l(1  )AK  RD)  g +D0: (28)
We substitute (28) into the rst-order conditions with respect to g andD0, respectively,
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to obtain
!
1
g
= (1  !)(1 + ) 1
l(1  )AK  RD   g +D0
+ (1  !) l(1  )A

1+
l(1  )A 
1+
fl(1  )AK  RD   gg  

l(1 )A
1+
+R

D0
; (29)
(1  !)(1 + ) 1
l(1  )AK  RD   g +D0
= (1  !)
l(1 )A
1+
+R
l(1  )A 
1+
fl(1  )AK  RD   gg  

l(1 )A
1+
+R

D0
: (30)
By rearranging (30), we obtain
D0 =

1+
(1 +    ) l(1  )A  R
(1 +  (1 + ))

l(1 )A
1+
+R
 fl(1  )AK  RD   gg : (31)
Plugging (31) into (29) yields (15). We substitute (15) into (31) to obtain the policy
function of D0, (16), and substitute (15) and (16) into (28) to obtain the policy function
of b.

B.3 Derivations of (19) and (20)
To derive the debt-to-GDP ratio in (19) and the tax rate in (20), let us rst recall the
government budget constraint,
 =
g + (1  l)b+RD  D0
l(1  )AK : (32)
Using policy functions (14){(16), we can write the denominator of (32) as
g + (1  l)b+RD  D0 =   fl(1  )AK  RDg+RD
= l(1  )AK + (1  )RD; (33)
where  is a constant parameter dened later.
Plugging (33) into (32), we obtain
 =
l(1  )AK + (1  )RD
l(1  )AK = +
(1  )R
l(1  )A 
D
K
: (34)
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The next task is to determine . For this purpose, we use (14){(16) to rewrite g +
(1  l)b D0 as
g + (1  l)b D0 =
24 !
(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + ! +
(1  l)(1  !)(1 + ) (l(1  )A+R)
l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
 
(1  !)
n

1+
(1 +    ) l(1  )A  R
o

l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
35  (l(1  )AK  RD)
=
241  (1  !)l(1 + ) (l(1  )A+R)
l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
35  (l(1  )AK  RD) :
Thus, the term  is dened by
  1  (1  !)l(1 + ) (l(1  )A+R)
l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
:
The nal task is to calculate D=K. Recall the capital market-clearing condition,
K 0 =

1 + 
(l(1  )AK  RD   g)  1
1 + 
D0:
Plugging (15) and (16) into this expression and rearranging the terms, we obtain
K 0
l(1  )AK  RD =

1 + 
  
1 + 
 !
(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !
  1
1 + 

(1  !)
n

1+
(1 +    ) l(1  )A  R
o

l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
=
(1  !)
n

1+
l(1  )A+ (1 + )R
o

l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
;
or
K 0 =
(1  !)
n

1+
l(1  )A+ (1 + )R
o

l(1 )A
1+
+R

f(1  !) (1 +  (1 + )) + !g
 (l(1  )AK  RD) : (35)
Using (16) and (35), we can write D0=K 0 as
D0
K 0
=
1+ 
1+
l(1  )A  R

1+
l(1  )A+ (1 + )R for t  1;
as demonstrated in (18). Substituting (18) into (34) yields the tax rate in (20).
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Figure 1: The ratio (1   l)b=Y in the balanced and unbalanced budget cases. The hori-
zontal axis takes the value of . We assume  = 0:35 and  = (0:95)30. The assumption
of  implies that an annual discount factor is 0:95, and that one period is 30 years in
length.
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Figure A.1: The gure plots LHS and RHS when  = 0:35 and  = (0:95)30.
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